In Sta. Lucia v. City of Pasig [G.R. No. 166838], Sta. Lucia and Cainta moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a “prejudicial question” to the resolution of the case.
The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and location, the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of Pasig.
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings. Elucidating on the legal meaning of a “prejudicial question,” it held that “there can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil.” the Court of Appeals further held that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta to be present, were not met.
Suspension of the Proceedings in the Civil Case for Collection of Real Property Taxes was Proper
The Supreme Court set aside the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals stating, thus:
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the suspension of its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 125646]. We agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary dispute case presented a prejudicial question and explained our statement in this wise:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
X x x x x Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. x x x.
It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term “prejudicial question,” as appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to its ordinary meaning, than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, even without the impact of the connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state that a trial court may control its own proceedings according to its sound discretion.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its sound discretion.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there would be no controversy at all.
In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Note: Compare with Municipality of Cainta v. City of Pasig.
